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Abstract
Tax evasion is typically analyzed in a principal/agent framework, the govern-
ment (principal) trying to provide agents with the incentives to pay their taxes.
However, evading sales, excise or trade taxes requires the cooperation of at least
two taxpayers. When individuals evade taxes, they face two potential costs.
One is that tax evasion may be detected and sanctioned; the other is that their
partner in crime might cheat. An increase in the sanction for tax evasion leads
to a direct increase in the expected cost of a transaction in the illegal sector.
However, it may also reduce the incentive to cheat. It may then be that a
small increase in the sanction reduces the total cost of transacting in the illegal
sector. Tax evasion may increase as a result.
JEL Classiﬁcation: H26
Key Words: Tax Evasion, Cooperation, Sanctions
  For their comments, we thank Greg Dow, Brian Krauth, Michael Smart, and seminar
participants at Simon Fraser University and the 1999 meeting of the European Economic
Association. We are grateful for ﬁnancial support from FCAR and SSHRCC.1. Introduction
Most of the literature on tax evasion is presented in a principal/agent frame-
work, with the government (principal) trying to provide the right incentives
to each taxpayer (agent).1 Income taxes are generally thought to be suitable
for this type of analysis because the main strategic interaction is between the
taxpayer and the government. However, there are many types of tax evasion
which involve the participation of more than one taxpayer. Taxes on transac-
tions, such as sales taxes, excise taxes on tobacco or alcohol, and taxes on trade
are examples of taxes for which evasion often involves the collaboration of at
least two taxpayers — a buyer and a seller. In fact, even income tax evasion
might require at least the complicity of second parties, as when labour services
are supplied in the untaxed sector. The purpose of this paper is to investigate
the determinants of tax evasion in settings where agents to a transaction must
collaborate to determine whether to undertake it in the illegal sector.2
When two individuals decide to undertake a transaction in the illegal sector
to avoid paying a tax, they forego the option of using the legal system to resolve
any dispute that could arise. Consequently, they face two potential costs. The
ﬁrst one is that the government may detect and sanction a tax evader, while
the second one is caused by potential cheating by the partner in crime.3 In
1 The classic analysis is by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). For general reviews of
the traditional literature,see Cowell (1990) and Myles (1995). Tax evasion has
been incorporated into an optimal non-linear income tax setting by Cremer and
Gahvari (1996),Marhuenda and Ortu˜no-Ortin (1997),and Chandar and Wilde
(1998). Some recent analysis has departed from the principal-agent setting by
allowing taxpayers and tax collectors to collude. See,for example,Flatters and
MacLeod (1995) and Hindriks,Keen and Muthoo (1999). In this literature,there
is no cooperation among taxpayers,which is the focus of our analysis.
2 Governments are well aware that tax evasion may require the collaboration of
several individuals. In an attempt to reduce underground transactions,the Cana-
dian federal government has launched an advertisement campaign to deter house
renovation paid for ’under the table’. (Globe and Mail,9 August 1999,page A6).
3 When transacting in the illegal sector,individuals can cheat in several ways. One
possibility is for an individual to provide less care than was agreed on in avoiding
1particular, the chances of getting caught evading taxes depend jointly on the
evasive activities of the two transacting partners. An increase in the sanction
for tax evasion leads to a direct increase in the expected cost of a transaction
in the illegal sector. However, a higher sanction may also facilitate cooperation
between criminals by reducing the incentive to cheat. It may then be the case
that a small increase in the sanction reduces the total cost of a transaction in
the illegal sector and therefore increases tax evasion.
We construct a model in which a continuum of inﬁnitely lived agents,
diﬀering only in their aversion to dishonesty, decide whether to undertake their
transactions in the legal or the illegal sector. All agents undertake a large
number of transactions each period — for simplicity, one with every other
agent in the economy. This ensures that pairs of agents form lasting repeated
relationships, and that relationships span all combinations of honesty-types.
For each transaction in each period, the pair of agents involved can choose
which sector to use. Those who choose the legal sector in a given period obtain
a sure beneﬁt from the transaction, but have to pay a tax. Those who choose
the illegal sector avoid paying taxes, but may be caught and sanctioned. They
receive an uncertain beneﬁt depends on their aversion to dishonesty and on
the level of crime enforcement undertaken by the government. The chances of
getting caught engaging in an illegal transaction depend partly on the amount
of costly avoidance eﬀort that is provided jointly by the two parties to the
transactions.
Two agents transacting in the illegal sector can potentially increase their
detection by the authority. This is the kind of cheating we are focusing on in
this analysis. Of course,such cheating increases the probability of detection for
all individuals involved in the transaction. Examples of such cheating are that
an individual may publicly (rather than privately) consume a good,or that he
may openly discuss the ‘low’ price he paid for the good. Another example is that
individuals that have transacted in the illegal sector should also provide care
so as to avoid being caught for other crimes,because observing one crime may
reveal that other crimes have been committed.
2payoﬀ by simultaneously providing a high, or cooperative, level of avoidance
eﬀort. However, they will then expose themselves to potential deviation by their
partner. Because contracts in the illegal sector are not enforceable, reputations
and punishments are the only mechanisms that can be used to enforce higher
levels of eﬀort. The possibility of cooperation enhances the payoﬀs from illegal
activity. To enforce cooperation, agents will punish each other. Depending
on the agents involved, the punishment may occur either in the legal or the
illegal sector with low (non-cooperative) avoidance eﬀort levels. We assume
that no agent can force another one to transact in the illegal sector. For some
agents — the ones with higher aversion to dishonesty — the non-cooperative
equilibrium in the illegal sector yields a lower expected payoﬀ than that of the
legal sector. Consequently, if one of them prefers the legal sector, they will
transact in the legal sector for the duration of the punishment phase. On the
other hand, if both prefer the illegal sector, they will keep on evading taxes with
non-cooperative levels of avoidance for the duration of the punishment phase.
Under the assumptions we make, the resulting equilibrium takes the fol-
lowing form. Agents with high aversion to dishonesty pay taxes on all their
transactions. Agents with low or medium aversion avoid taxes by transacting
in the illegal sector with all agents willing to do so. Agents in the illegal sector
cooperate with other agents in the illegal sector until one of them deviates.
When one partner deviates, they enter the punishment phase of the strategy.
Pairs of agents with low aversion to dishonesty remain in the illegal sector for
the punishment phase, while those in which at least one of the two agents has a
medium aversion to dishonesty go back to the legal sector. Because an agent’s
aversion to dishonesty is observable, and because agents are not willing to make
a transaction in the illegal sector if they know that their partner will cheat, some
agents who would prefer to trade in the illegal sector simply cannot. Indeed,
some agents are unable to commit to behaving cooperatively in the illegal sector
and, consequently, have to trade in the legal sector with every other agent. This
3implies that in equilibrium, there is no deviation from cooperative behaviour
in the illegal sector. In contrast with the standard literature, it is not solely
the willingness to participate in the illegal sector that determines which agents
evade taxes, but also their ability to commit not to cheat. Some agents are left
out of the illegal sector despite their desire to transact in it, simply because
they cannot commit to providing the cooperative level of avoidance eﬀort.
When the government changes the level of the sanction, all payoﬀs in the
illegal sector decrease, but in diﬀerent proportions for diﬀerent types of par-
ticipants. An increase in the sanction can lead to a larger reduction in the
deviation payoﬀ than in the cooperation payoﬀ. Consequently, an increase in
the sanction can increase cooperation, thereby increasing tax evasion. Despite
the direct impact of an increase in the sanction on the expected payoﬀ of trans-
acting in the illegal sector, tax evasion can increase with an increase in sanction
because it is the ability to commit not to cheat that determines which agents
evade taxes. By the same token, an increase in the tax rate can lead to an
increase in tax evasion.
In the following section, we formulate the model and our assumptions, and
set out the types of equilibria in avoidance eﬀort and their payoﬀs that can
occur in the illegal sector. In section 3, we analyze which levels of dishonesty
will be suﬃcient to enable agents to commit to cooperative transactions in the
illegal sector repeatedly. Then, in section 4 we can establish precisely how
transactions divide themselves between the legal and illegal sectors according
to the aversion to dishonesty of the partners. We show that all transactions in
the illegal sector will be accompanied by cooperative avoidance eﬀort levels—
no one will deviate in equilibrium. Moreover, we show that the number of
transactions carried out illegally will increase in the sanction as well as in the
tax rate provided the discount rate is high enough. We conclude in Section 5.
42. The Model and Static Equilibrium
The economy consists of a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived agents, who diﬀer only
in their tolerance for engaging in illegal transactions—those that involve evading
taxes. Denote this tolerance for dishonesty by θ,w i t hθ ∈ [0,1] and distributed
according to cumulative distribution function F(·)w i t hF(·) > 0 everywhere.
The total population is normalized to unity. Agents engage in many bilateral
transactions with one another, and these may be in the illegal sector u or the
legal one  . Our analysis focusses on representative types of transactions that
can occur in each sector. To facilitate the analysis, we make the extreme as-
sumption that each agent engages in a large number of transactions per period,
one with every other agent in the economy. This allows us to treat each transac-
tion as an inﬁnitely repeated game in which lasting relationships determine the
nature of the transactions. In particular, since the payoﬀs from transactions
depend upon whether agents behave cooperatively or not, repeated relation-
ships can give rise to cooperative behaviour being sustained in equilibrium.
An alternative more complex model would assume that transactions occur ran-
domly with other agents in the economy. It would be more diﬃcult to maintain
cooperative behaviour in this setting because punishment for non-cooperative
behaviour would be less eﬀective. But Kandori (1992a,b) has shown that the
folk theorem for repeated games can be generalized to the case of a large com-
munity of individuals who are matched randomly in pairs each period. Even
if two individuals are matched only once, cooperation can be enforced if their
behaviour in previous matches is observable. In that case, an individual may
want to cooperate because cheating now will trigger retaliation from future
partners, whoever they are.
We abstract from production and simply suppose that each agent receives
a before-tax beneﬁt of v per legal transaction in each period.4 An agent of type
4 The total pre-tax surplus from a legal transaction is therefore 2v,which is as-
5θ who makes a transaction in the illegal sector only gets a beneﬁt of θv,a sw e l l
as incurring the chance of being caught. All agents are risk neutral. They can
undertake any given transaction in the legal or the illegal sector, provided the
agent with whom they are transacting agrees. In our model, there will be some
agents who conduct a portion of their transactions in sector   and the rest in
sector u.
For transactions in sector  ,at a xt per transaction is levied on both agents.
Thus, the total tax per transaction is 2t a s s u m e dt ob es h a r e de q u a l l y .( A l t e r -
native assumption regarding the incidence of the tax would have no signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on our results.) The net beneﬁt each agent obtains per transaction in
sector  , denoted π , is therefore π  = v − t.
Agents transacting in sector u pay no tax. Those who are detected evading
the tax have a sanction s imposed on them. Agents can reduce the likelihood
of detection by providing some costly eﬀort. Denote by αi the avoidance eﬀort
provided by agent i. For simplicity, we assume that αi can take only two
values, 0 or 1, and that the cost associated with each of these choices is 0
and c, respectively. The eﬀort levels of the two individuals engaged in an
illegal transaction combine to yield a probability that their transaction will be
detected. If both choose α = 1, then the probability is p2; if both choose α =0 ,
the probability is p0; and if only one chooses α = 1, the probability is p1.I t
is natural to assume that as total avoidance eﬀort increases, the probability
that an illegal transaction will be detected decreases, so p0 >p 1 >p 2.N o t e
the important point that the probability of detection depends only on current
avoidance eﬀort. It does not depend either on past avoidance eﬀort or on
whether illegal behaviour has been detected in the past. This is obviously
a strong assumption — it is conceivable that enforcement agencies monitor
sumed to be equally shared in the current analysis. Results similar to those
obtained below could be obtained in a generalized version of the current model
in which there is unequal sharing of the surplus,provided that side payments are
possible.
6past criminals more intensively than they monitor those who have never been
convicted. Nonetheless, the assumption is not uncommon in the literature and
we adopt if for simplicity. By the same token, we assume that the sanction s
is independent of past convictions.
We assume that agents undertaking an illegal transaction choose their
avoidance eﬀort levels α simultaneously. We will say of two individuals provid-
ing maximal avoidance eﬀort that they cooperate.I ti su s e f u l t od e n o t ee ﬀ o r t
under cooperation as αc,w i t hαc = 1. Under cooperation, agent i obtains a
payoﬀ πc
i = θiv −p2s−c. Alternatively, the two individuals may not cooperate
and provide minimal avoidance eﬀort, denoted αn,w i t hαn = 0. Under no
cooperation, the payoﬀ of agent i is πn
i = θiv −p0s. Because eﬀort is chosen si-
multaneously, an individual may fool his cooperating partner and deviate from
maximal to minimal avoidance eﬀort. We denote eﬀort under deviation by αd,
with αd = 0. Because the fooled partner provides αf = αc = 1, the payoﬀ of
agent i who deviates is πd
i = θiv − p1s. That of the fooled partner, say j,i s
π
f
j = θjv − p1s − c.
The payoﬀs πz
i , z = c,n,d,f are those of a two-player stage game in which
each player chooses between cooperating and not cooperating (deviating). In








i = θiv − p2s − c
πc
j = θjv − p2s − c
π
f
i = θiv − p1s − c
πd
j = θjv − p1s
πd
i = θiv − p1s
π
f
j = θjv − p1s − c
πn
i = θiv − p0s
πn
j = θjv − p0s
Figure 1
For our purposes, it is useful to assume that the payoﬀs are structured as
7in a prisoner’s dilemma. We also want to ensure that payoﬀs are such as to
lead to interior solutions with transactions divided between the legal and illegal
sectors in equilibrium. We therefore make the following assumptions.5
Assumption 1:
(a) p1s + c>p 0s
(b) p2s + c<p 0s
(c) p2s + c>p 1s
(d) t>p 0s>p 2s + c
(e) p1s + c>t
Part (a) implies that the best response to non-cooperation is to not cooperate.
Part (b) says that the payoﬀ under cooperation is larger than that under no
cooperation. Part (c) ensures that there is an incentive to fool one’s cooperating
partner and deviate. Part (d) implies πc
i(θ =1 )>π  
i(θ =1 ) ,w h i c hs a y s
that for some agents — those with high enough values of θ — it is better to
evade taxes if they can cooperate than to transact in the legal sector. This
assumption ensures that there will be some tax evasion in equilibrium. Part
(d) also implies that πn
i (θ =1 )>π  
i(θ = 1), meaning that for agents with
suﬃciently high values of θ, evading taxes under no cooperation dominates a
transaction in the legal sector. The implication of part (d) is that cooperative
and non-cooperative outcomes in the illegal sector are both possible. Finally,
part (e) states that all individuals prefer to transact in the legal sector than to
be fooled.
In every period, all agents make one transaction with every other agent.
Since no agent can force another agent to engage in an illegal transaction, a
transaction will be undertaken in sector u only if both agents prefer to do so,
5 Mongrain (2000) shows that the same prisoner’s dilemma structure for the payoﬀs
can be obtained in a continuous eﬀort model.
8given their own tolerance for dishonesty and what they observe. At the begin-
ning of each period, agents can observe for all other agents with whom they
transact: (i) their level of tolerance to dishonesty θ; and (ii) the level of avoid-
ance eﬀort α they exerted whenever they transacted in the illegal sector in any
previous period. Given that information, agents choose which of their transac-
tions to undertake in the legal or the illegal sector. Then, for all transactions
that are undertaken in the illegal sector, both agents decide simultaneously and
non-cooperatively their levels of eﬀort α.6 Finally, transactions occur. Those in
the legal sector bear taxes, and some of the transactions in the illegal sector are
detected and sanctions are imposed. Since the probability of detection depends
only on current period avoidance eﬀort, the sequence of transactions constitute
a repeated game in which the only link between periods is the ability of agents
to observe the past behaviour of their partners.
We now turn to the determination of which pairs of agents transact in
the illegal sector and which in the legal sector. This involves specifying the
circumstances that must apply for (repeated) equilibrium transactions in the
illegal sector to entail cooperative behaviour. To anticipate our results, we shall
show that in equilibrium, only two sorts of transactions will occur — those in
the legal sector and cooperative outcomes in the illegal sector. There will be a
marginal agent with θ = ˜ θ such that transactions will be in the illegal sector only
if both agents have θ ≥ ˜ θ. If at least one agent has θ<˜ θ, the transaction will
be a legal one. Thus, there will be no deviations from cooperative behaviour in
equilibrium. Having characterized ˜ θ, we can then show how government policies
aﬀect the volume of illegal transactions. Paradoxically, increasing the sanction
level s can actually increase the number of illegal transactions. At the same
time, increases in the tax rate t will also increase the size of the illegal sector.
6 Agents may provide diﬀerent levels of avoidance eﬀort in diﬀerent transactions.
93. Cooperative Equilibrium in the Illegal Sector
We begin by considering how a pair of agents can sustain a level of eﬀort αc =1 ,
given that both choose to undertake the transaction in the illegal sector. The
strategies for each agent and for each transaction in the illegal sector are the
following. We assume that all agents use the same trigger strategy with inﬁnite
punishment. This is one of an indeﬁnite number of strategies that would lead
to similar results. We choose to concentrate on this particular strategy because
it is simple and standard in the literature on repeated games. Thus, in any
time period, for each transaction in the illegal sector, agent i chooses the level
of eﬀort αc = 1 with every agent j who never deviated in any transaction with
him in the past. At the same time, for each agent i and each transaction in the
illegal sector, agent i punishes every agent j w h od e v i a t e di na n yt r a n s a c t i o n
with him in the past. Equivalently, for any transaction between agent i and j
in the illegal sector, if agent j deviates in any time period, agent i will punish
agent j in all subsequent periods.
Punishments can take two possible forms. After agent j deviates, i and
j can make all their subsequent transaction in the illegal sector, playing the
no-cooperation equilibrium with αn = 0. However, it is possible that one of the
two (or both) agents obtains a higher payoﬀ by transacting in the legal sector
instead. If so, that agent refuses to deal in the illegal sector so both agents will
make all their subsequent transactions in the legal sector. The following lemma
indicates how transactions in the punishment phase divides between the two
sectors. The proof of this and other lemmas, as well as all propositions are in
the Appendix.
Lemma 1: Let ¯ θ =( v − t + p0s)/v. For any agents i and j, if both agents
have θ ≥ ¯ θ they will transact in the illegal sector for the punishment phase,
while if at least one of the two agents has θ<¯ θ they will go back to the legal
sector for the punishment phase.
10It can be seen that ¯ θ is increasing in s, so a higher sanction induces more agents
to go back to the legal sector for the punishment phase. At the same time, a
tax increase causes more agents to stay in the illegal sector for the punishment
phase. Since we have assumed that t>p 0s, some agents will want to stay in
the illegal sector for the punishment phase.
Given these strategies and punishment phases, we now establish the condi-
tions under which agents i and j can commit in an inﬁnitely repeated series of
transaction to exerting the cooperative level of eﬀort αc = 1. An agent who can
commit to cooperation is one who is better oﬀ being in a cooperative equilib-
rium indeﬁnitely rather than deviating now and subsequently being punished
forever, where the punishment can be either in the legal or the illegal sector
depending on the two partners to the transaction. Let δ be the discount factor
for all agents. Consider ﬁrst the case where both agents have θ ≥ ¯ θ,s ot h e y
would choose to make all their transactions in the illegal sector for the punish-
ment phase. It is straightforward to determine the circumstances under which
they could commit to cooperate for all future periods.
Lemma 2: For any pair of agents i and j with θ ≥ ¯ θ (so punishment will be
in the illegal sector), both agents can commit to cooperating in every period
if
δ>
p2s + c − p1s
(p0 − p1)s
(1)
We assume in what follows that condition (1) is satisﬁed. Thus, all pairs of
agents i,j with θ ≥ ¯ θ can commit to cooperating.7 Next, consider the case
where at least one of the transacting agents has θ<¯ θ, so both agents would be
obliged to go back to the legal sector for the punishment phase. Some of these
agents could also commit to cooperating.
7 Assuming that condition (1) is not satisﬁed implies that in equilibrium there are
no cooperative transactions in the illegal sector. The results will parallel those
of the traditional literature in this case.
11Lemma 3: For any pair of agents i and j for which at least one of the two
agents has θ<¯ θ (so punishment will be in the legal sector), agent i can
commit to cooperating forever if and only if θ ≥ ˜ θ,w h e r e˜ θ is given by:
˜ θ =
δ(v − t)+( p2s + c) − (1 − δ)p1s
δv
(2)
It is straightforward to show that if condition (1) is satisﬁed, then ˜ θ ≤ ¯ θ.S i n c e
(1) is assumed to be satisﬁed, then the marginal agent with ˜ θ is one that can
commit to cooperating forever if transacting in the illegal sector. Therefore,
cooperation in the illegal sector will occur for transactions between all pairs of
agents i and j such that θ ≥ ˜ θ. Conversely, if at least one agent to a transaction
has θ<˜ θ, then at least one agent would not cooperate in an illegal transaction.
We are now in a position to state our ﬁrst main result.
Proposition 2: If δ<(p1 − p2)/p1, then an increase in the sanction leads to
an increase in the number of agents who can commit to cooperating forever
in the illegal sector. The same obtains, without the restriction on δ,w h e n
the tax rate increases.
Proposition 2indicates that if the discount factor is low enough, an increase in
the sanction can increase the number of agents who can commit to cooperating
forever in the illegal sector, that is, d˜ θ/ds < 0. The intuition is as follows. When
s increases, the payoﬀ from cooperating forever in the illegal sector decreases,
while the payoﬀ from taking the punishment phase in the legal sector stays the
same. This makes it harder for an agent to commit to cooperating. However,
an increase in s leads to a larger reduction in the payoﬀ from deviating than
that in the payoﬀ from cooperating. This can lead to an increase in cooperation
if the discount factor is low enough. In the same way, when t increases, the
payoﬀ from the punishment phase decreases so it becomes more attractive for
an agent to cooperate.
12Having established which agents can commit themselves to cooperating if
they choose the illegal sector, we now examine which agents will in fact prefer
to make their transactions in the illegal sector.
Lemma 4: An agent i would prefer to cooperate in the illegal sector rather
than transacting in the legal sector if θ ≥ ˆ θ,w h e r eˆ θ is given by:
ˆ θ =
v − t + p1s + c
v
(3)
It can be seen that ˆ θ is decreasing in t and increasing is s.
Lemma 5: ˆ θ<˜ θ.
Lemma 5 is important because it implies that the number of agents who would
like to make their transactions in the illegal sector if they could cooperate (those
with θ ≥ ˆ θ) is larger than the number of agents who can commit to cooperate
in the illegal sector (those with θ ≥ ˜ θ). This leave us with some agents who
would be better oﬀ in the illegal sector in a cooperative equilibrium, but cannot
commit themselves to cooperating. Because we ensured, in Assumption 1, that
no agent wants to make a transaction in the illegal sector if he knows that his
partner will cheat, the capacity to commit to cooperate is a key factor: it is
this capacity that ultimately determines who transacts in the legal or the illegal
sector.
We also know that agent i of type θ prefers the illegal sector without
cooperation relative to the legal sector if πn(θ) ≥ π . This condition will be
satisﬁed only for agents with θ ≥ ¯ θ. Moreover, for those agents, cooperation
is sustainable (assuming that condition (1) is satisﬁed) and leads to higher
payoﬀs. Consequently, all those agents will prefer to cooperate. This implies
that only those agents with θ ≥ ¯ θ who deviated will choose not to cooperate in
the illegal sector (and in equilibrium none will deviate).
134. The Equilibrium Number of Legal and Illegal Transactions
We now have all the elements to describe completely the equilibrium. Given our
assumptions that: (i) the least honest agent prefers the illegal sector without
cooperation to the legal sector (πc(θ =1 )>π  ); and (ii) the discount factor
is high enough to ensure that all pairs agents who would take the punishment
phase in the illegal sector can commit to cooperating (condition (1)), the θ’s
satisfy the following chain of inequalities:
0 ≤ ˆ θ ≤ ˜ θ ≤ ¯ θ ≤ 1
where
ˆ θ =
v − t + p2s + c
v
; ˜ θ =
δ[v − t]+p2s + c − (1 − δ)p1s
δv
; ¯ θ =
v − t + p0s
v
The equilibrium can be described as follows. All agents with θ<ˆ θ prefer
to trade in the legal sector, so make all their transactions there. (Recall that
they cannot be forced to trade in the illegal sector.) All agents with ˆ θ ≤ θ ≤ ˜ θ
would prefer to cooperate in the illegal sector rather than trading in the legal
sector. However, they are not able to commit to cooperating in equilibrium, so
any illegal trades must involves a non-cooperative equilibrium (αn =0 ) . B u t
in these circumstances, they prefer the legal sector over the non-cooperative
equilibrium in the illegal sector, so they all choose to transact in the legal sector.
Finally, all agents with θ ≥ ˜ θ prefer to cooperate in the illegal sector rather
than transacting in the legal sector, and they can also commit to cooperating
in equilibrium. They will make their transactions in the legal sector with all
agents for which θ<˜ θ, and will make their transactions cooperatively in the
illegal sector with all agents for which, like themselves, θ ≥ ˜ θ. This equilibrium
is summarized in the following proposition and in Figure 2.8
8 Recall that all those with θ ∈ [˜ θ,¯ θ] will punish a deviation in the legal sector
while those with θ ∈ [¯ θ,1] will prefer to do so in the illegal sector. Since all agents
transacting in the illegal sector do cooperate,punishment is never observed.
14Proposition 3: All agents with θ ≥ ˜ θ make their transactions cooperatively in
the illegal sector with all agents for whom θ ≥ ˜ θ and make their transaction
in the legal sector with all agents for whom θ<˜ θ. All agents with θ<˜ θ
make all their transaction in the legal sector.
0 ˆ θ ˜ θ ¯ θ 1
Transact in legal sector
  
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Proposition 3 has an implication that cannot be found in the standard
literature on tax evasion. Some agents who would like to evade taxes are not
able to do so (those with θ between ˆ θ and ˜ θ). The reason is that these agents are
too ‘honest’ (have a low tolerance for dishonesty θ) and are not able to commit
to cooperating: they would always deviate from a cooperative equilibrium.
Because honesty is observable, no agents want to trade with them in the illegal
sector. In contrast with the standard literature, it is not solely the diﬀerence
between the payoﬀs in the legal and illegal sectors that determines who is the
marginal evading agent, but the ability of this agent to commit to cooperating
in equilibrium. This diﬀerence has important implications for the eﬀects of
policy, as the following proposition demonstrates.
15Proposition 4: If δ<(p1 − p0)/p1, then an increase in the sanction and an
increase in the tax rate both lead to an increase in the number of transactions
that are made in the illegal sector.
This counter-intuitive result can be interpreted in the following way. When
the sanction increases, the ability of an agent to commit increases as long as the
discount factor is small enough. Since it is not the preferences of an agent but
his ability to commit that determines his choice of sector, an increase in s can
lead to a increase in the number of transactions for which taxes are evaded. It
follows that an increase in tax also leads to an increase in tax evasion because ˜ θ
decreases. This latter result is counter to that obtained in the standard model,
where an increase in the tax rate cause a reduction in evasion if absolute risk
aversion is decreasing with income (Myles, 1995). It is also important to notice
that any policy which aﬀects the willingness to evade tax (ˆ θ) but does not aﬀect
the ability of agents to cooperate (˜ θ) will have no impact on tax evasion, at
least as long as ˜ θ>ˆ θ continues to apply.
5. Conclusion
The two key results of this paper are as follows. First, when tax evasion requires
the complicity of two agents (e.g., a buyer and a seller), the main determinant
of which transactions are in the illegal sector is the ability of each of the par-
ticipating agents to commit to undertaking the cooperative level of avoidance
activity. Indeed, some agents would like to evade taxes, but cannot because
of their inability to commit to cooperate. In our model, ability to commit is
determined by an agent’s tolerance for dishonesty. More dishonest agents are
better able to commit since their pay-oﬀ from illegal activity is higher. Second,
when the discount factor is low enough, an increase in the sanction can increase
the ability of an agent to commit to cooperate, and lead to more tax evasion.
Our analysis could be extended in several ways. The current model assumes
16that aversion to dishonesty (θ) as well as past deviations are observable. As
is shown in Mongrain (2000), making these things costly to observe — in the
limit unobservable — can help explain the dynamics of recidivism. Indeed,
individuals may then go back and forth from the legal to the illegal sector. In
the same vein, individuals could search for partners in the illegal sector rather
than meet them randomly. If search costs are large enough, cheating is less likely
to occur because individuals willing to transact in the illegal sector would ﬁnd
it more diﬃcult to seek each other out. It would also be possible to endogenize
the size of the surplus that agents obtain when transacting. For example, an
individual with a low aversion to dishonesty may decide to carry out relatively
large transactions in the illegal sector. Finally, the current analysis is a positive
one. It would be interesting to compare optimal deterrence policy — optimal
probability of detection and sanctions — in the current multi-agent framework
with those that obtain in the standard tax evasion model.
17Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :If πn
i (θi) ≥ π  and πn
j (θj) ≥ π , punishment after
deviation is in the illegal sector because both agents prefer the no-cooperation
outcome. If πn
i (θi) <π   and/or πn
i (θi) <π  , punishment after deviation is in
the legal sector. We can ﬁnd a ¯ θ which is the solution to πn(¯ θ)=π ,w h e r e¯ θ
is given by ¯ θ =( v − t + p0s)/v.Q E D
Proof of Lemma 2: For any two agents with θ ≥ ¯ θ, the discounted payoﬀ
of cooperating forever is πc(θi)/(1 − δ)=( θiv − p2S − c)/(1 − δ), while the
discounted payoﬀ from deviating is πd(θi)+δπn(θi)/(1−δ)=θiv−p1s+δ(θiv−
p0s)/(1 − δ). An agent with θi will choose to not deviate if πc(θi)/(1 − δ) ≥
πd(θi)+δπn(θi)/(1 − δ) which implies: (θiv − p2s − c)/(1 − δ) ≥ θiv − p1s +
δ(θiv−p0s)/(1−δ). Simplifying, we get that agent i prefers to cooperate forever
if: δ>(p2s + c − p1s)/((p0 − p1)s). QED
Proof of Lemma 3: For any pair of agents i and j for which at least one of the
two agents has θ<¯ θ, the discounted payoﬀ of cooperating forever is given by
πc(θi)/(1 −δ), while the discounted payoﬀ of deviating is πd(θi)+δπ /(1 −δ).
Agent i will prefer cooperating forever if πc(θi)/(1 −δ) ≥ πd(θi)+δπ /(1 −δ).
We can ﬁnd a ˜ θ for which all agents with θ ≥ ˜ θ will want to cooperate, and
for which all agents with θ<˜ θ will want to deviate, where ˜ θ is given by:
˜ θ =( δ(v − t)+( p2s + c) − (1 − δ)p1s)/(δv). QED
Proof of Proposition 2: Using ˜ θ from Lemma 3 we obtain: ∂˜ θ/∂s =( p2 −
(1 −δ)p1)/(δv). It is easy to show that ˜ θ is decreasing in s if δ<(p1 −p2)/p1.
Recall that we have assumed that δ>(p2s + c − p1s)/((p0 − p1)s). However,
it is still possible to ﬁnd a range where this condition is satisﬁed and at the
same time δ<(p1 − p2)/p1,a sl o n ga sp1c<(p1 − p2)p0s.A sf o rt a xt,u s i n g
equation (2) yields ∂˜ θ/∂t = −1/v < 0. QED
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 :An agent i of type θ will prefer to cooperate in the
illegal sector rather than transacting in the legal sector if πc(θ) ≥ π .I ti se a s y
to see that agent i will prefer the illegal sector if θ ≥ ˆ θ,w h e r eˆ θ is given by:
ˆ θ =( v − t + p1s + c)/v.Q E D
Proof of Lemma 5: Using (2) and (3), ˆ θ<˜ θ if (v − t + p2s + c)/v <
(δ(v −t)+p2s+c−(1−δ)p1s)/(δv), or p2s+c>p 1s, which we have assumed
to be satisﬁed. QED
18Proof of Proposition 3: This is an immediate implication of Lemma 5 and
of the description of the equilibrium. QED
Proof of Proposition 4: We know from Proposition 2that it is ˜ θ that deter-
mines which transactions are made in the legal or in the illegal sector. We also
know from Proposition 1 that if δ<(p1 − p0)/p1,t h e n∂˜ θ/∂s < 0. Also note
that from the deﬁnition of ˜ θ, ∂˜ θ/∂t < 0. Since F(·) > 0, and since the number
of transactions in the illegal sector is (1−F(˜ θ))2, it follows that anything that
decreases ˜ θ also increases the number of illegal transactions. QED
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